

Research Package #3

(Junior and Senior High)

*Jr. High: "This House Prefers Stability To Democracy In The Arab World."*

*Sr. High: "This House Prefers Stability To Democracy In The Arab World."*



Regional & Provincial Topic (Feb/Mar)  
2013-2014



“Democracy is worth dying for, because it's the most deeply honorable form of government ever devised by man.”

– Ronald Reagan

The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.

- Winston Churchill

## *“This House Prefers Stability To Democracy In The Arab World.”*

The **Proposition Team** supports the resolution and will say “**YES**”

The **Opposition Team** opposes the resolution and will say “**NO**”

Both Proposition and Opposition Teams will try to pick about 3 or 4 good reasons to support their position and try to develop each by going through 4 steps:

1. State your point.
2. Explain your point.
3. Provide evidence in support of your point (give an example).
4. Explain how that evidence proves your point (tie it back to your theme).

Each argument will look like this:

**Point #1:** \_\_\_\_\_

Explanation: \_\_\_\_\_

Example: \_\_\_\_\_

Tie point to theme: \_\_\_\_\_

**Point #2:** \_\_\_\_\_

Explanation: \_\_\_\_\_

Example: \_\_\_\_\_

Tie point to theme: \_\_\_\_\_

**Point #3:** \_\_\_\_\_

Explanation: \_\_\_\_\_

Example: \_\_\_\_\_

Tie point to theme: \_\_\_\_\_

# PROPOSITION TEAM

The job of the Proposition in any debate is to persuade the judges that the resolution should be supported. In order to accomplish this, there are a number of steps that the Proposition team must go through.

- 1) Define the resolution (Make sure everyone is clear upon what the Proposition is debating).
- 2) Present criteria (halfway between a model and definition: clearly outline what would constitute free immigration).
- 3) Present arguments in favor of the resolution.
- 4) Refute Opposition attacks on the Proposition case. (Show why the Opposition is wrong and the Opposition is correct).

Owing to time restrictions, the Proposition's duties are normally divided up between the first and second Proposition speakers. It is customary for the first proposition speaker to present two arguments followed by the second speaker who presents the final argument.

## AN EXAMPLE OF A PROPOSITION STATEMENT

In the last decade tumultuous political change has taken place in the Arab World. Starting with Tunisia, political dictators have been overthrown all over the Middle East, resulting in an aftermath of extreme political instability. Democracy is a powerful form of governance but requires political, economic and social stability to be sustainable and effective. In the current situation, establishing a stable economy, police force and promoting socioeconomic issues is preferred over establishing a democracy at this time in the Middle East.



Here are some arguments that the Proposition can use in developing their case to support stability over democracy in the Arab World.

- Elections are expensive to run. Without economic stability, it is not practical to establish a democracy. Money pouring into Middle Eastern nations recovering from revolution should be going towards rebuilding nations.
- Newly liberated countries need proven leadership. Temporary leaders should be appointed to bring about economic and cultural stability, while the correct funds and preparations are made for an election.
- By holding an election right after revolution, revolutionaries will most likely be favored. Though their intentions may be good, they are unstable as long-term leaders and may recreate a dictatorship with their own extreme values. Citizens are not always informed about their political choices and the consequences
- If a democracy is established, it will be weak due to the economic, political and social turmoil surrounding it. If the newly established democracy fails, people will lose faith in the idea of democracy as governance, even for a future form of government.
- With the Arab World under stable leadership, the rest of the global community will be at peace. They will trust the Middle East and will be more receptive to helping rebuild the nations.
- Longevity is most important when assessing the politics of the Middle East. Since election terms are so short, the ruling parties will not have time to carry out their objectives and instead will focus on winning elections, not carrying out the wishes of people. EVENTUALLY, democracy is the ideal choice, but that may take an extended period of time. We must accept that for the time being, stability is the goal that must be reached.
- With the number of insurgents known to be involved in Arab politics, an election cannot be trusted to be fair. An agreed upon appointed leader will be best option.

# OPPOSITION TEAM

The job of the Opposition is to be disagreeable! Whatever the Proposition believes, generally, the Opposition counters. The more you disagree, the better! The Opposition has to convince the judges not to accept the Proposition resolution.

The Proposition wants to convince the judges that their proposal should be adopted.

The Opposition wants to convince you that the Proposition proposal should not be accepted for one or more reasons.

The steps that the Opposition should use are:

- 1) Either agree with the Proposition definition or propose a definition of your own. (Only disagree if absolutely necessary. These make for messy debates.)
- 2) Rebut the Proposition arguments in favor of the resolution.
- 3) Attack the Proposition Model and sometimes propose a counter model
- 4) Present reasons (arguments) to oppose the resolution.
- 5) Refute Proposition attacks on the Opposition case (show why the Proposition is wrong and Opposition is right).

Owing to time restrictions, the Opposition duties are divided between the first and second opposition speakers.

It is the custom for the First Opposition Speaker to present two arguments and the second opposition speaker to present the final argument. (This is flexible!)

## AN EXAMPLE OF AN OPPOSITION STATEMENT

After years of stringent dictatorship, Middle Eastern nations are finally being given the change to taste freedom and the governance that comes with it, democracy. Citizens of oppressed nations value the power to choose their own leaders, and who are we, as western developed nations, to decide what is best? Democracy must be established in the aftermath of the Arab Springs, to avoid relapse into a state of dictatorship once more.

Some of the arguments that the Opposition can use in developing their case against stability over democracy in the Arab World:

- The purpose of the revolution was to instill fair government in the Middle East, a government elected by the people. By promoting stability over democracy, and possibly appointing temporary leaders, Arab nations risk relapse back into dictatorship systems.
- Who are we as the West to assess Middle Eastern political systems and determine that they cannot elect a proper government themselves? It is the Arab nations that have revolted and achieved freedom, it would be unconstitutional to take it away by not supporting their rights to establish a democracy.
- Democracy is about the people's choice, regardless about stability, democracy needs to be developed and grown. If a democracy isn't established right away, at what point would a nation be "properly able" to carry it out? There is no such point.
- Democracy provides changes in governments without violence. Power transfers will provide different dynamics. Parties will cater to the wishes of their people, not their own political agendas. There is an obligation towards the citizens.
- With the set up of democracies, governments are bound by election terms. The Arab world can explore their political boundaries like they were never able to before.
- The people of the Arab world will gain a sense of participation and involvement in their government, something they greatly need after generations of political oppression.

THE ARTICLES HERE HAVE BEEN EDITED, REPHRASED & ANNOTATED

# RESEARCH

**This Research booklet is not complete. It is only an overview of information and good debaters will use this booklet as a basis for their thinking and move on to other ideas and research. As well, the best foundation for any research into a topic begins with some basic reading on the ideas. Follow this with an interview with someone who is knowledgeable, can suggest ideas and can direct you to other ideas and research. Although you cannot quote this person unless he/she is published in print or on video, a human being can always explain issues better than an article.**

## US chooses stability over democracy in Egypt

In backing Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, the US has chosen stability over democracy: but it will get neither

[http://www.thecommentator.com/article/2132/us\\_choses\\_stability\\_over\\_democracy\\_in\\_egypt](http://www.thecommentator.com/article/2132/us_choses_stability_over_democracy_in_egypt)

On Thursday, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood president Mohammed Morsi passed an extraordinary presidential decree. This unilaterally fired the country's prosecutor-general, banned the judiciary from dissolving the country's constituent assembly and, conveniently, also declared all the president's decisions to be irrevocable and immune from any form of judicial challenge or overturn.

Morsi said this would allow him to **achieve** 'political and economic stability' in Egypt and to 'defend the revolution': an ominous phrase beloved by every revolutionary-turned-despot from Robespierre to Lenin and Mao.

This momentous step – which one Egyptian legal expert described as '**absolute fascism**' - was almost certainly given the nod by the Obama administration, either implicitly or explicitly. Only a few hours before his announcement, Hillary Clinton had **told** a press conference in Cairo that:

"Egypt's new government is assuming the responsibility and leadership that has long made this country a cornerstone of regional stability and peace."

After Morsi's announcement, the US State Department merely **observed** that Morsi's moves "raise concerns for many Egyptians and for the international community", hardly a resounding US denunciation.

The 'stability and peace' trade-off that was reached between Clinton and Morsi in Cairo is clear; in return for Morsi persuading Hamas to agree to a ceasefire with Israel, the US would allow him to seize new 'temporary' political powers under the guise of ensuring 'stability', both in Egypt and in the region.

This move – the latest instance of the Obama Whitehouse dressing up naivety for hard-nosed realism -- is short-sighted for two main reasons:

Firstly, it grants the Muslim Brotherhood the power to act with minimal checks and balances from Egypt's judiciary. Now that Egypt's non-ideological military has realized that it can prosper under an Islamist regime, the judiciary was the last branch of government still acting as a significant brake on Brotherhood ambitions.

For all its faults, this institution is now likely to be purged and silenced, with knock-on effects for Egyptian politics: opposition protesters will face tougher sentences, Brotherhood members – already

widely accused of attacks on rival demonstrators and of using sexual assault to intimidate liberal female oppositionists - will be able to act with greater impunity.

Ongoing, politically motivated prosecutions of opposition leaders, on charges from blasphemy to corruption, will also likely increase. Weakening Egypt's judges will also enable the Brotherhood to move against other sources of opposition formerly protected by the judiciary.

On Friday, **Gehad al-Haddad**, a senior Brotherhood adviser, tweeted ominously that after the Brotherhood had dealt with the judiciary, 'the police needs its own cleansing project, which this declaration enabled. Let's hope it's swift'.

Secondly, Hillary Clinton's 'peace and stability' trade-off has only granted Israel a short-term reprieve and has in the longer-term stacked the odds against the survival of the Jewish homeland.

Following Clinton's visit, Mohammed Badie, the Brotherhood's real leader who was prevented from standing for the presidency on a technicality, publicly **reiterated** the group's view on Israel that "jihad was obligatory" on Muslims, his sole proviso being that an armed attack on Israel by Arab states should only be "the last stage", once the Muslim world had achieved "unity"-- incidentally a word used by Morsi to justify his power-grab.

As will become clear, in the longer-term Clinton's deal with Morsi has weakened Israel by linking its security to the Muslim Brotherhood's political ambitions: if the US does not give a free hand to the Brotherhood in Egypt, the Egyptians will cease to rein in Hamas.

Clearly, this new dynamic works actively against Israel; the more Hamas threatens Israel, the more the US will have to concede to the Brotherhood in Cairo; a formula that only motivates the Brotherhood to allow Hamas' military capabilities strengthen further, all while the Brotherhood uses its control of Egypt to advance towards its planned 'last stage', namely the eventual liquidation of Israel.

It is of course possible that Morsi will keep his promise to relinquish his powers once a constitution is in place. However, Morsi and his followers believe their party acts on earth on behalf of God; how then can they reduce God's earthly powers and remain devout?

It is also possible that Morsi's unseemly lunge for the levers of power will galvanize the group's much-hyped 'liberal' wing. Certainly it has unnerved overseas supporters. Osama Saeed, the Scottish Brotherhood activist now working for al-Jazeera, **described** Morsi's defence of the move 'as reminiscent of Gaddafi'.

Dali Mogahed, a long-time US-based defender of the Brotherhood, **described** the move as 'a disaster'. It is also possible that effective domestic opposition to the Brotherhood will now finally coalesce: Mohamed ElBaradei's powerful denunciation on Friday of Morsi as a 'pharaoh', the Brotherhood's preferred term for Mubarak, clearly struck a nerve.

Yet these developments may be too little, too late. With the Brotherhood seizing dictatorial powers and silencing opposition voices, while simultaneously re-writing the country's constitution in order to hardwire Islamism into the country's governmental DNA, all apparently with the tacit support of Obama's White House, it may be too late to save Egypt from despotism.

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## **Egyptians grow increasingly glum: Attitudes towards Democracy**

<http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/16/chapter-3-attitudes-toward-democracy-3/>

Egyptians continue to express a strong desire for democracy and for specific democratic rights and institutions. They also tend to believe that having a democratic government should be a priority, even if that leads to some risk of instability; however, the percentage who prioritize stability has grown since last year. While they endorse democratic principles, most Egyptians say they are dissatisfied with the way their new democracy is currently working, and this view is especially widespread among supporters of the opposition. Moreover, while Egyptians continue to want democratic freedoms, they also express a strong desire for economic growth and law and order.

### **Support for Democracy, but Economy and Stability Also Priorities**

Two-in-three Egyptians believe democracy is the best form of government, while just 21% think that in some circumstances a non-democratic form of government can be preferable. An additional 11% say that, for someone like them, it does not matter what kind of government Egypt has. These results are very similar to last year, when 67% described democracy as the best form of government.

A notable gender gap exists on this question: 73% of men say democracy is preferable to other types of government, while just 59% of women hold this view.

A solid majority of Egyptians (60%) say the country's problems can best be solved by democracy, while 36% believe a strong leader would be best equipped for dealing with these problems. There has been little change on this question since last year, although confidence in democracy is higher today than it was in 2007, when the public was almost evenly divided between those who expressed confidence in a democratic system and those who had more confidence in a strong leader.

When asked whether having a good democracy or a strong economy is more important, Egyptians are more divided, although they lean toward the latter: 52% say a strong economy should be the priority, while 45% choose democracy.

By a slender margin, Egyptians tend to prioritize democracy over stability. About half (51%) say it is more important for Egypt to have a democratic government, even if there is some risk of political instability. Slightly fewer (43%) believe it is more important to have a stable government, even if there is some risk it will not be fully democratic. However, the percentage who prioritize stability has increased since 2011, when just 32% held this view.

Men place more importance on democracy than do women. Egyptians with a favorable opinion of the NSF are especially likely to say having a democratic government is more important than having a stable government. And those who do not believe laws should strictly follow the Quran are also more likely to prioritize democracy.

### **Support for Democratic Principles**

Majorities rate all of the specific democratic rights and institution on the survey as at least somewhat important, and most say a fair judiciary, free media, and honest, competitive elections are *very* important. Views about these features of democracy have mostly held steady since last year, although support for free speech has slipped – in 2012, 60% said it is very important to live in a country in which anyone can criticize the government, but now 51% express this opinion. The percentage who believe it is very important that Coptic Christians and other religious minorities can practice their religion freely also

declined slightly, from 38% to 32%.

Among the attributes of democracy on the survey, having a civilian-controlled military is considered a relatively low priority, although most still say it is at least somewhat important and 27% rate it as *very* important.

In addition to democratic freedoms, it is clear that Egyptians also consider economic prosperity and law and order top priorities. Fully 83% rate improving economic conditions as very important, and 62% say this about law and order.

### **Protecting Rights of Women**

While most Egyptians believe it is important that women have equal rights, they are divided over the current government's approach to this issue. Four-in-ten say the government is doing the right amount to ensure that women have the same rights as men, 33% think it is doing too little, and 15% believe it is doing too much.

There are no significant differences between the views of men and women on this issue, but there are notable divides along partisan and ideological lines. Egyptians with a favorable view of the NSF and those who do not think laws should strictly follow the Quran are particularly likely to say the government is not doing enough to ensure gender equality.

### **Most Unhappy with Way Democracy Is Working**

A 56% majority of Egyptians say they are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in their country; just 43% are satisfied. Interestingly, people who prioritize democracy over stability are especially likely to be unhappy with how the new democratic system is working (66% dissatisfied).

Roughly two-thirds of those with a favorable opinion of the NSF (66%) are dissatisfied, compared with just 48% of FJP supporters and 47% of those with a positive view of al-Nour.

By a narrow 51%-44% margin, Egyptians say the current government respects the personal freedoms of its people, although on this question there are again significant partisan and ideological gaps.

People with a positive view of the NSF, those who do not think laws should strictly follow the Quran, and those who prioritize democracy over stability are more likely to believe the current government is not respecting Egyptians' individual freedoms.

### **Voting and Protests**

Even though Egyptians are not happy with the way their new democracy is working, they have not lost faith in the value of political participation. Huge majorities say that voting (86%) and attending protests (82%) give them an opportunity to express their opinion about how the government runs things.

### **Between Democracy and Stability**

<http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7852>

How do we balance two conflicting imperatives for U.S. foreign policy: preserving the short-term stability of Arab regimes that have been friendly—or at least not explicitly and intractably hostile—to the United States and promoting a deeper, more organic stability in the region through democratic reform?

## Democracy Deficit

The problem is stark. The Arab world is the only major region that does not have a single democracy. If we look at the Middle East in general, only Israel and Turkey are democracies. Of the 16 Arab states, only Lebanon has ever been a democracy, and only a few could be described today as even semi-democratic. Whereas the rest of the world has been moving toward democracy and greater freedom over the past three remarkable decades, the Arab world has remained politically stagnant. In fact, the Arab region is the only part of the world where the average Freedom House rating of political rights and civil liberties is worse today than it was in 1974.

There is a serious problem with the nature of governance in the Middle East. The source of the problem, however, is not Islam as such. Forty-three nations in the world clearly have a Muslim majority. The 27 of these *outside* the Arab world have an average freedom score that is almost an entire point better, on the 7-point Freedom House scale, than the Arab states. Seven of those 27 Muslim nations are democracies; several other nations, such as Indonesia and Mali, are developing democracy; and democracy is visibly deepening in Turkey under a government led by a party that could be called in its orientation Islamic-democratic.

The growing body of evidence shows that Muslims desire democracy pretty much to the same degree that people of other faiths do, particularly when we control for education and income. That is clearly the case in Africa and Central Asia. Even in the Arab world, evidence shows that people in the region value democracy and that there is not much of a relationship between religious attachment and support for democracy.

These popular orientations among Muslims in the world correspond with the thinking of increasingly outspoken moderate Muslim intellectuals, who are making the case either for a liberal interpretation of Islam or for a broader liberal view that de-emphasizes the literal meaning of sacred Islamic texts while stressing the larger compatibility between the overall moral teachings of Islam and the nature of democracy as a system of government (based on such principles as accountability, freedom of expression, and the rule of law). Islam is undergoing a kind of reformation, with growing momentum among Muslim religious thinkers for a separation of mosque and state. Significantly, Arab intellectuals and civil society activists are themselves challenging the democracy and freedom deficit that pervades the Arab world.

## Demographic Time Bomb

A growing number of Arab scholars, journalists, civic activists, and even some government officials, as well as numerous foreign observers of the region, are becoming convinced that the center cannot hold without democratizing political reform. The old cyclical games of tactical liberalization—opening today and repressing tomorrow—have run their course. Burgeoning populations—whose demographic profiles are tilted dramatically toward the young—are deeply frustrated by the pervasive economic stagnation, abuse of power, and social injustice. They are also better informed—or at least more independently informed—about what is happening in the world than they used to be, and they are better able to organize outside government control. And they are not going to sit back and take it any more: that is one message of 9/11.

To the extent that Arab regimes do not reform politically and economically, they will erupt in one form or another over the coming years. What Thomas Friedman calls the “global supply chain” of suicide bombers is one form of eruption. The wave of venomous anti-Americanism is another. The rising tide of terrorist attacks inside Saudi Arabia is another. Sclerotic regimes that cannot generate jobs and hope at a faster rate than the population is growing cannot persist indefinitely. And the market-oriented economic reforms necessary to unleash economic growth are unlikely to occur without democratic change because, unless governments have much greater political legitimacy, they will not have the nerve, or the autonomy from the decades-long accumulation of vested interests, to take bold and difficult steps. There is a demographic time bomb ticking in the Middle East, and it is going to sweep away a lot of Western-leaning regimes sooner or later unless true reform begins soon.

## Promoting Democracy

Of course, “later” could be a long time coming. Knowing that—knowing how efficient, cunning, and ruthless the state security apparatus is in many of these countries; knowing the opportunism and

insecurity of middle-class opposition groups that do not want to rock the boat; understanding that change always carries short-term risks—American policymakers have tended to opt for the devil they know and leave the longer-term future to the next administration. That is why President Bush’s speech on November 6, 2003, to the National Endowment for Democracy, and his subsequent statements calling for a fundamental reorientation of American policy in the Middle East, was so visionary and courageous. Conceptually, the call for a broad shift in policy toward promoting democracy in the Middle East is bold and long overdue.

Normatively and conceptually, we are at a historic juncture, where moral imperatives—to support human rights and promote peaceful democratic change—and security imperatives converge as never before. After 9/11, the political transformation of Middle Eastern regimes toward greater freedom, responsiveness, transparency, accountability, and participation—and therefore a real capacity to achieve broad-based human development—has become not just a moral imperative but a necessary foundation for the security of Western democracies as well. Creating a new climate in the region that is much less conducive to hatred and terrorism requires a sweeping improvement in the character and quality of governance.

The question is, How do we do promote these changes in such a way that the search for an Arab Kerensky does not yield an Islamist Lenin instead?

The tone and style of our approach are absolutely vital. Today in the Arab world, the United States is virtually radioactive; Arab democrats who come too close to it risk being contaminated and burned. The people of the Arab world profoundly suspect our motives. They think we are only in Iraq for the oil. And it is hard to dissuade them when the only building we protected as Baghdad was being systematically looted after it fell was the oil ministry. They think we seek long-term imperial domination in the region, and it is hard to dissuade them when we do not renounce any intention of seeking permanent military bases in Iraq. They think we only want democracy when it produces governments friendly to the United States. And it is hard to dissuade them when we have taken no practical steps to follow up on President Bush’s bold speeches or to establish a dialogue with moderate Islamists in the region.

We must promote democracy in the Middle East. But we cannot do it rapidly, we cannot do it purely on our terms, and we certainly cannot do it alone. It has always been the case that success in this endeavor would require close coordination with our European allies. But in the wake of the mistakes and unilateralism of the Bush administration, I think we have no chance of fostering democratic change in the region without a truly transatlantic strategy that offers a true hope of economic and political progress. It is still the case that, if freedom is to advance in the world, the United States must lead. But, sometimes, we must lead more subtly—from behind—if we are to be effective.

In fact, we need unprecedented cooperation on three levels to promote democratic change in the Middle East: first, between Europe and the United States (as well as Canada and other democratic allies); second, between the governments and nongovernmental organizations of our democracies; and, third, between this new transatlantic alliance and reform-minded governmental and nongovernmental actors in the Middle East.

A group of European and American policy specialists (myself included), meeting over several months under the auspices of the German Marshall Fund, has recently laid out what its members consider to be a viable transatlantic strategy for promoting democracy and human development in the Middle East. Our strategy is based on five principles:

1. Regional ownership. Democratization and human development in the region must spring from indigenous roots. Western democracies should not seek to impose any formula for democratic change. But they *can* and *must* help from the outside—morally, politically, and materially.
2. Engaging rulers and the ruled. In identifying the “owners” and partners for reform, the West cannot look only to state officials, though they are important. We need to reach out directly to civil society.
3. Islam and democracy. We reject the argument that there is some intrinsic incompatibility between Islam and democracy or that the peoples of the region are incapable of democratic governance or do not want the same rights that are taken for granted in most other parts of the world.
4. Tailored policies. Each country in the region is unique and should be encouraged to come up with its

own national reform plan for democratic change, resulting from an open negotiation between the government, the political opposition, and civil society. A gradual, mutually agreed-upon timetable and formula for democratic change can allow time for moderates to organize politically and allow a greater plurality of forces in civil society to flower, thereby facilitating a democratic transition that cannot be captured by radical Islamists.

5. Filling the credibility gap. Western governments need to overcome their past track records of inconsistency and double standards. The burden is on our own governments and societies to demonstrate that we are serious about promoting genuine democratic change and that we are willing to sustain a serious commitment even in the face of short-term risks and costs.

Among the specific policy courses we recommend are the following:

- The transatlantic democracies should do more to link their economic assistance directly to political reform and good governance, providing tangible benefits for countries that are making *true* progress on political and economic liberalization.
- Benchmarks for actual behavior also need to be extended to other areas of cooperation, such as trade liberalization, debt relief, and symbolic honors such as high-level state visits. Middle Eastern governments that are not serious about reform should know that they will not benefit in the same way that reformers will.
- The West must reexamine its relationships with the region's security institutions. The United States and Europe should use their influence with friendly military and intelligence establishments to foster democratic change, to end repression against democratic forces, and to end the use of torture.
- The Western democracies should exhibit more visible, consistent, and effective solidarity with democrats and human rights activists in the region who are under threat or in detention.
- The Western democracies should increase substantially their support for civil society and political actors and institutions working to advance democracy within these societies.
- we urgently need to increase educational, social, and cultural contacts between the peoples of the West and the Middle East. This requires a new visa regime for travelers from the Middle East.

But, along with the above, a certain type of environment in the region is necessary to help foster democratic change. Crucially important are a sustained commitment to political reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as a more coherent and effective strategy to deal with Iran. But the highest priority in this regard is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The West cannot wave a magic wand to bring an end to this conflict. Nor can we allow aspirations for democratic change in the region to be held hostage by this conflict. But many in the Arab world today see a Western (and especially American) commitment to renew the role of honest broker in the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations as a litmus test of Western intentions and credibility. It is vital that the United States resume this role. Advancing the peace process is not a precondition for being able to foster the democratic process, but if the two proceed on parallel tracks, each effort is likely to be more credible and effective.

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His research papers are available at the Hoover Institution Archives.