

Research Package #3

(Senior High School)



“BIRT The use of force be supported to impose democracy.”

(VALUES DEBATE)

Senior High Regional / Provincial (Feb./Mar.) 2006-2007



The idea of democracy, although a modern touchstone in Western countries, is a relatively recent development: a legacy of historical revolutions both within and against former colonial powers. At present 120 of the world's 190 states have fair claims to being democracies (covering over fifty percent of the world's population). It should be remembered that, whilst democracy in the strictest sense has regard to free, fair, and regular elections, it needs the wider support of the rule of law and respect for the rights of its citizens. Countries in transition, not yet secure in all these areas, include Indonesia and Uganda; more complex are Peru and Haiti (where America intervened to restore democracy in 1994) which need democratic credentials to secure IMF funding. By contrast, Fiji and the Solomon Islands prove that democracy is not necessarily permanent.

Examples:

In 1945, the Allied powers insisted upon the establishment of democratic regimes in West Germany and Japan; American willingness to engage in foreign nation building was largely destroyed by the Vietnam war. In the 1950s to 1970s, the establishment of democracy was contested in internal and external action in South America, after Roosevelt's extension of the Monroe Doctrine (arguing that America should intervene in Latin America to pre-empt European involvement).

The doctrine of interventionism has been most hotly debated since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the Gulf War in the early 1990s, which vindicated Western military might whilst refraining from toppling Saddam Hussein.

In December 1992, George Bush Sr. launched "Operation Restore Hope" in Somalia, in response to reports of famine worsened by soldiers stealing food. Intervention in civil war turned into a disaster first for the UN, which lost 151 soldiers and four civilians in attacks on its compounds; and then for the USA, whose helicopter attack on Aided in 1993 resulted in eighteen deaths. If Somalia demonstrated the problems of intervention, in 1994 ethnic massacres in Rwanda proved the dangers of isolationism, as countries were slow to respond to the reports of genocide, wary of invoking their duties according to the 1949 Convention.

The question of intervention is largely dependent upon the power of domestic opposition. In Romania, popular uprisings after 1989 overturned the government of Nicolae Ceausescu; whilst in Zimbabwe today the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) attempts to use popular strikes and growing discontent to remove Robert Mugabe from power. In the Middle East, opposition to longstanding governments from the 'Arab Street' is treated with caution by America; in favour of democracy yet fearing the popularity of theocratic leaders. Secular governments in Jordan, Syria, and Egypt have, however, demonstrated remarkable staying power.

Attitudes to intervention are categorized largely in American terminology. Of those authors mentioned below, Mead divides attitudes into "Jacksonian" (concerned with American prosperity and security), "Hamiltonian" (favouring economic integration), "Jeffersonian" (wary of intervention), and "Wilsonian" (emphasizing the moral obligation to promote worldwide democracy). Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institute divides interventionists into "assertive nationalists" and "democratic imperialists" or neoconservatives; the latter including men such as Robert Cooper and Michael Ignatieff. Krauthammer argues that the US is powerful enough to forge its own path in the world; by contrast Nye argues that American supremacy is purely military, that it must cooperate to maintain economic strength, and that there is a third level of economic and international power relations which are not organized by governments.

Should the use of force be supported to impose democracy? In a values debate, the **Affirmative Team supports the resolution and will say "YES"** and the **Negative Team opposes the resolution and will say "NO"**.

The Affirmative cannot expect the Negative to argue for dictatorship, thus must argue for the coercive imposition of democracy rather than "soft power" and influence alone. The Affirmative must decide whether to argue for unilateral (most likely American) action as well as multilateral intervention (by the UN), and, if the former case, must prove that this is a realistic possibility as well as arguing on moral grounds. The Negative would simply argue against the use of force, arguing that democracy typically emerges from within a society, and history demonstrates the difficulty of making democracy work. Imposing it externally presents further challenges while risking a backlash.

The Affirmative will be saying:

Democracy promotion has emerged in the post-September 11 world as one of the core principles of US foreign policy. While the United States has historically paid lip service to the goal of democratization, this was typically counterbalanced by the perceived need to maintain good relations with non-adversarial authoritarian states in strategic areas. This debate has been recast in the last several years in light of the emerging view that the United States can no longer ignore the authoritarian nature of many governments, particularly in the Middle East, whose lack of political and economic freedom is seen as contributing to religious radicalism, support for terrorist groups and anti-Americanism. President Bush, in his 2005 State of the Union Address, committed the United States to an active democratization program aimed at ending tyranny in our world.

Many who advocate for active US efforts in democracy promotion see it both as the bedrock of the US political system and a universal value that can be successfully transplanted in virtually any country or region. The current test case for this is Iraq. The US has stated that the Iraq War was justified on the grounds of removing Saddam Hussein's tyrannical regime and replacing it with a democratic alternative and has committed substantial resources to democratizing the country. The hope is that a viable democracy in Iraq will stabilize the country and assist in spreading liberal political values to other Middle Eastern states, thereby undermining support for terrorism and making the US more secure.

We fretted rightly about the spread of weapons of mass destruction, but the truth is that we worry more about nukes in the hands of autocracies like China, Iran, or North Korea. No American loses sleep that the UK or France has deadly missiles. A Russia that used to paralyze American foreign policy by virtue of its atomic arsenal poses little threat as long as President Putin can be persuaded not to destroy his consensual government. We should of course try to keep the number of nuclear nations static. Yet the next-best course is to ensure that Pakistan or China can evolve into free societies, and hope that should Iran obtain such weapons, its mullahs can be overthrown and their successors can follow the course of a South Africa whose new democracy dismantled its inherited arsenal. We cannot expect a successful democratic Germany or Japan to sit back and watch criminal states like Iran and North Korea go nuclear without expecting them to do the same - thus the need now to support democratic agitation in Tehran and elsewhere.

Why the Use of Force SHOULD be Supported to Impose Democracy

1. History has shown that democratic regimes are the best form of government. Countries have not only the right but also the duty to intervene to liberate others to enjoy their human rights. Furthermore, as war between two true democracies is rare, world peace is enhanced by the removal of repressive regimes.
2. Merely seeking to influence dictatorships in the direction of democracy is not enough, and internal opposition is often too weak to gain freedom for itself. Countries shrouding themselves in the pretence of elections in order to prevent invasion or to gain international funding must not be allowed to play the system.
3. During the Cold War, Western powers often supported illiberal regimes for reasons of realpolitik. After 1989, there can no longer be an excuse for this. It could be argued that past western complicity in dictatorship requires us to make amends by promoting democracy more aggressively in future.
4. The worldwide threat from terrorism would be reduced by limiting those states willing to harbour and trade with terrorist groups, as the Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security argued. Pre-emptive attacks on illiberal regimes serve to prevent later threats and act as a deterrent against bad behaviour.
5. It is a fallacy to suggest that the rule of law, or protection for civil rights, is unacceptable in different regions. There are enough types of democracy to allow for social and historical variations - illiberal political parties can always stand for election.
6. When a country is already engaged in conflict or civil war, to bring international power to bear is a way of conflict-resolution. To wait, as occurred in Rwanda, will only do more damage.
7. To rely on multilateral action is utopian. The UN doctrine of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of independent nations means that unilateral or bi-lateral actions are the only realistic possibilities. This is especially important given that China has a veto on the Security Council and other SC regular members are not themselves democracies.
8. Democracies have successfully emerged from wars in the past. There was a fair bit of imposition in the now successfully democratic parts of the British Empire. Japan's imposed democracy is deep-seated. As countries of the former Soviet empire have demonstrated, democracy plausibly offered is almost never refused.
9. Radical Islamists and others hostile to Western interests cannot be wished away: They are powerful forces in the Middle East that, until their recent participation in elections, pursued their goals by terrorism. Democratic participation has caused Hamas, Lebanon's Hezbollah and at least some of Iraq's Sunni and Shiite groups to scale back violence at least temporarily. Over time, it is more likely than exclusion and suppression to moderate their political aims.
10. We might welcome the benign dictator who would nurture the "rule of law" until his nation was "ready" for democracy -- and then would give way gracefully to his matured people. But for the same reason that we wish for civil society as a precursor, most dictators do everything they can to squelch it. Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak gives space to the Muslim Brotherhood while persecuting his secular liberal opposition, because he wants to be the only acceptable alternative; he doesn't want a civil society. In much of the autocratic world -- Central Asia, Russia, Burma -- the picture is the same.

And the Negative will say:

The use of force can never be justified to seek to impose democracy on another country. There are many reasons for this. As Iraq reminds us, it is very very hard to do and often will lead to more suffering and armed conflict. Moreover, democracy is not yet a universal value and I do not think we have the right to impose this form of government on others. Democracy can work only if the people of a nation find a way to get on the path to democracy. Then we have an obligation to help them stay on that path. Once a people have started on the path to democracy, they have taken sovereignty into their hands. Any group in that state which seeks to usurp that power is acting to undercut the sovereignty of a people and the international community, in my view, has a duty to do what it can to protect the people's sovereignty.

Forcing democratization's pace risks unrest, particularly where deep faultlines exist within societies. Both sectarian differences and opposing economic interests can work against the basic level of consensus that democracy requires, and ethnic conflict introduces another volatile factor that often combines with religion and economic disparities. Rapid change and competition for power within a society exacerbates preexisting ethnic tensions, as seen with post-1989 conflicts from Yugoslavia to Rwanda. Populists from Slobodan Milosovic to Robert Mugabe and Hugo Chavez seize upon ethnic resentment as a tool for maintaining their power as leaders of populist movements operating behind a quasi-democratic façade. Whether conflict derives fundamentally from ethnic differences or economic disparities matters less than its impact on stability. Civic patriotism cannot establish a demos without social cohesion and a general agreement on rules for public behavior. Public opinion driven by demagogues or ideology exerts a destructive force. Forcing democracy can unleash these forces, defeating its own aims and risking a backlash that can make the world less secure.

Why the Use of Force SHOULD NOT be Supported to Impose Democracy

1. It is a contradiction in terms to argue that democracy can successfully be imposed. Democracy relies on the rule of law (undermined by military imposition), freedom of choice and independence (destroyed by external determination), and on accountability (impossible when a foreign power chooses one's rulers).
2. It is acceptable to encourage the pursuit of democracy, but this is not the same as imposing it. The desire for, and fight for, democracy must come from within; otherwise the system created will be unable to withstand pressures for long.
3. The hypocrisy of turning on a regime once maintained is morally reprehensible. The new world order cannot be accepted as necessarily a safer place; stability may be safer than universal democracy bought with many lives and a great deal of resentment. The concept of democracy itself may be degraded in the eyes of many if it comes to be associated with invasions undertaken for suspect (e.g. economic) motives.
4. The doctrine of pre-emption depends on analysing unclear evidence, and undertaking potentially unjustified invasions. Terrorist groups will merely find greater levels of popular support, and receive funding from citizens in democratic nations. 'Security' is merely an excuse for intervening in oil- or resource-rich areas, whilst poorer nations are left to suffer.
5. To impose democracy is to foist a set of Western values onto populations with different cultural backgrounds (e.g. Islamic, tribal, Confucian). Cultural imperialism must not be armed. To permit the election of former dictators leaves dangerous loopholes for the future.
6. To intervene may mean that conflict escalates. Democracy may be encouraged after a war has ended; or dictatorships undermined by economic and cultural sanctions without military action, which is costly in terms of money and lives on all sides.
7. Unilateral action is burdensome, and dangerously dependent upon the political whim of foreign electorates - often unwilling to commit the troops and money for long-term rebuilding of nations. The worst of all scenarios may be a bloody invasion and regime change, followed by anarchy when the external power swiftly withdraws. Even when invaders remain to oversee the installation of a new regime, they may choose pliant appointees rather than risk the uncertainty of true democracy.
8. If Iraq is any indication, it will not be cheap or easy. The result may not be a safer and more secure America if U.S. attempts to spread democracy breed more anti-American sentiment in the Middle East and the wider Muslim world.
9. Experience indicates that democracy requires a particular combination of institutions and informed public opinion. Outside efforts to impose change typically bring unforeseen consequences that may result in neither stability nor democracy.
10. The just war tradition, a body of thought that has developed over time to evaluate the use of military force, does not support the use of force to promote democracy. The established reasons for using force in the tradition are three: self-defense, retaking stolen property, and punishment. These do not include promoting democracy.



RESEARCH

Michael Ignatieff, the front runner for the leadership of the Liberal Party of Canada and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Kennedy School of Government in Harvard University, promoted the spread of democracy by force by the United States in his recent article "Who are the Americans to Think That Freedom Is Theirs to Spread?" He shares the US government's vision of the violent and compulsory promotion of democracy, the war against terrorism and the use of instruments, for example torture, which are apparently in need of a revisionist treatment, and he believes that only the US can lead the inevitable process of promoting democracy around the world, and that process sometimes demands war as its painful instrument.

The article is too long to reproduce here, but can be found at:

http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgnews/Features/opeds/062605_ignatieff.htm

THIS WILL BE A USEFUL ARTICLE FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE.

Also, another useful article, was written by Mariano Aguirre, entitled "Exporting Democracy, Revising Torture: The Complex Missions of Michael Ignatieff." Aguirre reacts to Ignatieff's essay. Aguirre's article can be found at:

http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/jefferson_2679.jsp

THIS WILL BE A USEFUL ARTICLE FOR THE NEGATIVE.

When There's No Good Guy

Dinesh D'Souza

Hoover Digest 2003 No. 1 <<http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3063121.html>>

Critics of President Bush's policy toward Iraq often raise the same questions: Isn't it ironic that we're trying to get rid of Saddam Hussein when we once supported him? Doesn't history show that you cannot impose democracy at the point of a bayonet? Isn't it hypocritical for the United States to condemn Saddam as a dictator when it supports many unelected regimes?

These criticisms of American foreign policy are not justified, however, and provide no basis for opposing a U.S.-led military campaign to liberate Iraq. A brutal dictator such as Saddam has no inherent right to rule. His support for terrorism, his willingness to use chemical and biological weapons, and his attempt to acquire nuclear weapons all make him an imminent danger to world peace and security.

"But why should America get rid of this dictator while it continues to support dictators elsewhere in the world?" the critics of an Iraq invasion ask. For decades, these critics say, U.S. leaders have sung paeans to democracy and human rights while backing dictatorships such as Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, Augusto Pinochet in Chile, the shah of Iran, and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. Even now, they point out, the United States is allied with such despots as General Pervez Musharaff in Pakistan, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and the members of the royal family in Saudi Arabia.

First consider the longtime U.S. support for Somoza, Marcos, Pinochet, and the shah. In each case, the United States eventually turned against the dictatorial regime and actively aided in its ouster. In Chile and the Philippines, the results were favorable: Democratic governments that have so far endured replaced the Pinochet and Marcos regimes. But in Nicaragua and Iran, one form of tyranny gave way to another. Somoza was replaced by the Sandinistas, who suspended civil liberties and set up a Marxist-style dictatorship. In Iran, a harsh theocracy presided over by the Ayatollah Khomeini replaced the shah.

These outcomes highlight a crucial doctrine of foreign policy: the principle of the lesser evil. In the real world, as opposed to the philosophy seminar, the choice is often not between the good guy and the bad guy but between the bad guy and the really bad guy. In such a situation, a country is justified in allying with a bad guy to oppose a regime that is even more terrible. The classic example of this occurred in World War II. The United States allied with a very bad man, Josef Stalin, to defeat someone who then posed a greater threat—Adolf Hitler.

Although it's impossible to say who would succeed Saddam, the United States can be confident that his replacement will be less barbarous and less dangerous. So the United States will avoid the problem that it had in Iran, where the shah's flawed dictatorship was replaced by an even worse regime.

Once the principle of the lesser evil is taken into account, then U.S. alliances with dictators such as Marcos and Pinochet become defensible. These were measures taken to fight the Cold War. If one accepts what today is an almost universal consensus—that the Soviet Union was an "evil empire"—then America was right to attach more importance to the fact that Marcos and Pinochet were reliably anti-Soviet than to the fact that they were autocratic thugs.

But, the critics respond, the Cold War is over. Why back such tyrannical regimes in the Middle East as the royal family in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan's Musharaff? Again, applying the principle of the lesser evil, what is the alternative? Are there viable democratic forces in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia to replace the existing despots? Or is the alternative to Musharaff the forces of radical fundamentalism, the Osama bin Laden folk? In that case, America's support for Musharaff is fully warranted.

Critics of U.S. intervention abroad frequently miss the point that foreign policy is a practical enterprise. Those who condemn the United States for once backing bin Laden and Saddam are blind to the fact that situations change and, therefore, that policies must be devised to deal with a particular situation at a given time. It is foolish to hold the United States culpable for "inconsistently" changing its policy when the underlying situation that justified the original policy has also changed.

By this reasoning, America was justified during the 1980s in providing weapons to the mujahideen, even if this group included bin Laden, to drive the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. Similarly, there was nothing wrong with America's supporting Saddam in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the greatest threat in the region came from Iran. Obviously bin Laden and Hussein are much greater threats today, and we know things about them now that were not known at the time we supported them. This new situation justifies the Bush administration's current policy of attempting to neutralize the threat posed by both men.

But, as the critics continually emphasize, does violence really solve problems? Actually, yes. Violence helped to end the regimes of Hitler and Benito Mussolini. The atomic bombs the United States dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however controversial their use, solved the big problem of an unyielding Japan. Violence proved equally effective against the Taliban. "You can't impose democracy at the point of a bayonet" is another shibboleth. At the end of World War II, America imposed democracy in just that manner on Japan and Germany, and the result has proved resoundingly successful in both countries.

The problem with critics of U.S. force is that they are never willing to give bayonets a chance.

Democracy Cannot be Imposed by Force

Carnegie Ethics Online

No. 3, 2006

Anthony F. Lang, Jr.

August 7, 2006

<http://www.cceia.org/resources/ethics_online/5405.html>

"To go to war for an idea, if the war is aggressive and not defensive, is as criminal as to go to war for territory or revenue; for it is as little justifiable to force our ideas on other people, as to compel them to submit to our will in any other respect." With these words, written in 1859, John Stuart Mill stated limitations to intervention that are as valid today as they were then.

Is democracy promotion an exception to the rule? This question is at the heart of many current debates in the international system, not least of which is the war in Iraq. My answer is no, although I find this position problematic because I believe that democracy is the best political system of all those in existence. According to most political theorists, democracy at its most basic is rule by the people, which usually includes competitive elections, a constitution that protects individual rights, and a separation of powers.

Democratic governance provides the best chance for individual citizens to achieve their interests in relation to their fellow citizens. Those interests can include security, wealth, and even happiness. By giving individuals the right to participate in government, democracy provides a weak guarantee that a person's human rights will be respected. Democracy also provides some assurance that no single powerful individual or faction will be able to dominate the political system.

Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant in the late 18th century argued that democracies, or what he called republics, are more peaceful than other forms of government. Evidence from international relations theory supports Kant's claim, demonstrating that democracies tend not to go to war with other democracies. While democracies certainly use military force—the United States today, Great Britain and France in the first half of the 20th century being perfect examples—evidence compiled through various studies suggests that they rarely if ever go to war with one another.

While democratic states tend to protect their own citizens and tend to be more peaceful, does it follow that democratic systems ought to be imposed on communities by the use of military force?

The quote from J. S. Mill suggests that while some liberal theory might support the use of force to promote democracy, other traditions within liberalism are more opposed. Mill's argument, one shared by Michael Walzer in the first edition of *Just and Unjust Wars*, is that communities fighting to promote their own rights must rely on their own purposes.

The just war tradition, a body of thought that has developed over time to evaluate the use of military force, does not support the use of force to promote democracy. The established reasons for using force in the tradition are three: self-defence, retaking stolen property, and punishment. These do not include promoting democracy.

Justifications for using force in international law get closer to promoting democracy, but they also do not allow it. International law allows war for self-defence and has, over the past 20 years, begun to develop a justification for using force to protect human rights. If democracy is considered a human right, then perhaps it might be justifiable according to international law. I would argue, however, that democracy is not a human right, but, rather, it provides the best defence of human rights for individuals.

We have, thus, something of a dilemma. On the one hand, we see that democracy can be argued to be the best political system. On the other hand, we have a strong resistance to using force to promote democracy in liberal theory, the just war tradition, and international law. Is there any way out?

One possible avenue to escape this dilemma comes from the writings of the former Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In 1996, as he was being forced out of office by the United States, Boutros-Ghali published the last of his three Agenda documents, *Agenda for Democratisation*. In that document, Boutros-Ghali argued that the United Nations, as representative of the international community, should actively promote democracy. During his tenure, the United Nations did exactly this, by helping to run elections in Cambodia.

But, importantly, Boutros-Ghali also argued that democracy is not something that occurs only inside states. Rather, democratization should take place among states at the international level as well. In other words, until the international community as a whole becomes democratic—i.e., decision making in various international bodies needs to be more inclusive and representative, and should have more balance among the powers—democracy cannot be promoted at the national level.

Turning Boutros-Ghali's idea into reality is challenging, for certain. One possible way to do this is through greater inclusion of NGOs in various international conferences—a strategy initiated by Boutros-Ghali during his tenure, when he invited various groups to Conventions in Cairo (on women) and Vienna (on human rights). While including NGOs does not ensure that democracy will flourish around the world, by giving these groups more of a role in international governance, they might have more of a role in domestic governance.

The current conflict in Iraq demonstrates the dangers of promoting democracy in an undemocratic international system. While many Iraqis are glad to be rid of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship, they are loath to accept the presence of American guns and soldiers in their country to enforce a democratic system. Until the international community appreciates the point made by Boutros-Ghali, promoting democracy by war or otherwise will continue to generate resistance.

Condoleeza's Nonsense About Democracy

John Chuckman

March 31, 2004

<http://www.rense.com/general50/condo.htm>

Condoleeza Rice wants to bring democracy to the Middle East. Ms. Rice, an expert on what is now an obsolete subject, the Soviet Union, believes this can be done the way the United States brought democracy to Chile or Iran or Afghanistan - that is, by violently overthrowing governments.

Does democracy come from the full belly of a B-52 and the murderous aftermath of coups?

Apparently not. Virtually none of the countries that America's freedom-loving army of enlightenment has bombed and shot-up over the last sixty years is today a democracy.

One is reminded of the claims of Napoleonic France that it was spreading revolutionary principles by conquest. The conquest part was vigorously pursued, but the *liberté, égalité, et fraternité* part left a little something to be desired.

Ms. Rice displays little understanding of the history of democracy or of the circumstances which make it possible. She is not alone in this. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's efforts on "democracy initiatives" displayed a similar lack of understanding, although it must be said in Ms. Albright's favor, she was less inclined than the ever-hysterical Ms. Rice to classify unprovoked attack by a great power as an initiative for democracy.

Democracy is simply a natural development of a healthy, growing society. Over the long term, it requires no revolution, no coup, and no sacred writ. It grows and blooms as automatically as flower seeds tossed in a good patch of earth, although it is a plant whose maturity is measured in human lifetimes rather than seasons.

The American Revolution did not produce anything resembling a democracy. Nor did the later Constitutional Convention. It took about two hundred years of growth and change in the United States for that to happen. The powerful Senate, able to block the elected President's appointments and treaties, only changed from being an appointed body to an elected one in 1913. The Senate to this day uses undemocratic operating rules and bizarre election patterns to shield it against public opinion.

The popular vote for President did not matter originally. Apart from the fact that only a small number of males meeting property requirements could vote, the members of the Electoral College, drawn from political elites, were the ones whose votes actually counted. This absurdly out-of-date and anti-democratic institution still exists, and it can cause serious problems as we saw in the election of 2000.

America has two parties sharing a quasi-monopoly on political power, and they produce much the same effects in the body politic that quasi-monopolies produce in the market place. The two quasi-monopoly parties are financed through a corrupt system of private donations. America herself still has a considerable way to go along the path to democracy.

Yet Americans generally believe that their Revolution and Constitutional Convention created a full-blown democracy and near-perfect system of government right from the start. Perhaps this explains the blind faith of people like Ms. Rice in thinking that if you just have a big war or coup somewhere, you can create a democracy.

Democracy comes gradually because it represents a massive social change that affects all relationships in society. The chief driving force towards democracy is the emergence of a strong middle class whose members have too much at stake to leave decisions to a king or group of aristocrats. The size of the middle class expands by steady economic growth. In the West, this process of change has proceeded steadily since the Renaissance and the rise of science and applied technology, with variations in the pattern of individual countries reflecting adjustments to peculiarities of local culture, invasions, civil wars, and varying rates of economic change.

Many of the societies America looks askance at in the world today make no progress towards democracy because they make little progress of any kind, especially economic progress. Static societies with little or no economic growth are ones where ancient customs and social relationships do not change, where kings or warlords rule just as they did thousands of years ago in early societies.

Economic growth is like a magical solvent that begins to erode old relationships. And given enough of it, over a considerable period of time, it erodes old ways of governing completely. This process is observable even within regions of a country. The American South was remarkably backward and static for a good part of the 20th century. But the shift of business and middle-class populations to the sunbelt during the middle of the century brought some rapid change - ergo, the phenomenon known as the New South.

The United States could make a genuine contribution to the spread of democracy were it to focus attention on the economies of the world's more backward places. It might start with some generosity in foreign aid. The United States is the stingiest of all advanced countries in giving economic assistance to poor countries, giving at an annual rate of 1/10 of one percent of its GDP.

Reducing or doing away with American agricultural subsidies that impoverish third-world farmers would also be a great help. So, too, the tariff and non-tariff barriers that the U.S. uses against many products from these struggling countries.

In general, concern for democracy calls for the U.S. to start behaving more like a responsible neighbor in the international community and rather less like an 18th century French aristocrat who barely notices as his carriage thumps over the body of whoever happened to be in its path.

Resources

Articles that Researchers Found Useful in Preparing This Package

"Imposing the Best System by Force?" Anthony F. Lang, Jr.

<<http://www.islamonline.net/discussion/thread.jspa?threadID=772>> - This is an excellent discussion forum about the imposition of democracy by force.

"Exporting 'Democracy' - Importing Trouble." Justin Raimondo. <<http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=8830>> - This is an excellent speech from a debate about the use of force. Difficult to understand.

"The Case for Democracy." The Washington Post. March 5, 2006.

"We Can't Force Democracy." Robert D. Kaplan. The Washington Post. March 2, 2006.

"Bush's Self-Evident Certitude." Michael Kinsley. The Washington Post. March 3, 2006.

"Imposing democracy no perfect shield, but it's a start." Frank Devine. The Australian. June 23, 2006.

<<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,19556789-31501,00.html>>

"Democratization, Order, and American Foreign Policy." William Anthony Hay. April 2006.

<<http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200604.americawar.hay.democratizationorderforeignpolicy.html>>

"Imposing Democracy on the World." Charles V. Peña. San Francisco Chronicle. January 30, 2005.

<<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2005/01/30/EDG7IB0VH01.DTL>>

"Who Are Americans To Think That Freedom Is Theirs To Spread?" Michael Ignatieff. New York Times Magazine. June 26, 2005.

"USA Can't Impose Democracy on Afghans." Amitai Etzioni. USA Today. October 11, 2001.

General Information

Deatabase.org - Imposition of Democracy

http://www.idebate.org/deATABASE/topic_details.php?topicID=259

IslamOnline.net Discussion Forum

<http://www.islamonline.net/discussion/index.jspa>

UNA-USA: The US and UN Ways of Nation-Building

<http://www.unausa.org/site/pp.asp?c=fvKRI8MPJpF&b=730613>

Reports

The Brookings Institute - Foreign Policy Studies

http://www.brook.edu/fp/fp_hp.htm

CATO Institute - Foreign Policy

<http://www.cato.org/foreignpolicy/index.html>

